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This work shows the results of experiments where subjects play 
the Schelling's spatial proximity model (1969, 1971a), in which 
choices are made sequentially, and a variation of it where the 
decision-making is simultaneous. The results of the sequential 
experiments are identical to Schelling's prediction: subjects finish in 
a segregated equilibrium. Likewise, in the variant of simultaneous 
decision the same result is reached: segregation. Subjects’ 
heterogeneity generates a series of focal points in the first round; 
the subjects in order to locate themselves use these focal points 
immediately, and as a result, the segregation takes place again. 
Keywords: Schelling models, economic experiments, segregation.  
1. Introduction 
Schelling’s model (1969, 1971a) represents a paradigm inside the theory: 
it is a simple model, laconic in hypothesis and with very powerful results, 
from a theoretical point of view. In addition, it is an empirically relevant 
model since it offers a clear explanation of the segregation phenomenon, 
a problem that worries planners since the second half of the twentieth 
century.
3 Moreover, segregation has turned out to be one of the most 
important topics in the socio-political and public economic debate (The 
Economist, 2001). 
In general, there are two basic variants of Schelling's "model of spatial 
proximity"
4. The first version is a one-dimensional model and is introduced 
in Schelling (1969). In Schelling (1971a) a two-dimensional version is 
presented, which also appears later in Schelling (1971b, 1978). This work 
analyzes experimentally the one-dimensional model. 
In the one-dimensional version of Schelling's spatial proximity model 
(1969, 1971a) a society is modeled through a sequence of individuals 
distributed along a line
5. Two types of individuals form the society: whites 
and blacks. The adjacent neighbors to the left and right hand side define 

3 It is interesting to bear in mind that there are many forms of segregation. The 
segregation can happen in a racial context, but it can also appear for religious matters, 
sexual orientation, etc. 
4 Schelling calls this microeconomic model of neighborhood segregation as spatial 
proximity model. There are other variants of Schelling’s model in the literature, both in 
linear and in matrix form, see Young (1998) or Zhang (2004a, 2004b). 
5 The number of individuals can be infinite, but Schelling (1971a) refers to the possibility 
of an infinite continuous line or a circle. The advantage is that in these cases all the 
individuals have the same number of neighbors.  
the neighborhood of each individual
6. The individuals who compose this 
society are utility maximizers, that is to say, they look for their best 
interest. The preferences of an agent are marked by his level of tolerance 
regarding the number of neighbors equal to him. For example, a slightly 
tolerant agent would be one who demands that all his neighbors next to 
him are of his same type. Nevertheless, a "moderately” tolerant agent 
would accept that half of his neighbors were like him
7.  
In short, a striking result of Schelling’s model is that even beginning from a 
society where individuals are moderately tolerant regarding the number of 
neighbors of their same type (as it has been defined above), the sum of 
the individual options generates a totally segregated community. Figure 1 
illustrates how beginning from a situation of complete social integration 
(circle a) we reach, after individuals are allowed to move, a completely 
segregated society (circle b).  
 
Figure 1: Integration (a) versus segregation (b) with N=8 subjects 
 

6 In this way, if we say that each individual has four neighbors, those will be the two on 
his right hand side and the two to his left. 
7 In this last frame, together with the assumption that each agent uses the information of 
the type of neighbors he has to his right and to his left, we could say that agents have 
very minimum requirements about the composition of their neighborhood.  
This solution of equilibrium is a very powerful result since it seems to point 
out that it is not possible to do anything against segregation because it is 
simply the equilibrium configuration.  
Nevertheless, Schelling’s model, in its original version, has some 
particularities. One of the most important is the fact that subjects move 
sequentially in order to reach the equilibrium outcome. All the individuals 
who are not in a situation beyond their threshold of tolerance are 
organized to carry out their displacement in the society. This is, first an 
individual decides if he wants to move or not, then the following one 
decides, and this process carries out up to the last one.  
From a theoretical point of view sequentiality is not trivial. This is so as in 
the sequential model the k-th subject already observes as given the first k-
1 decisions and he can only decide on the remaining N-k. Thus, in the 
sequential model every subject has different information, which depends 
on the moment when the individual decides. On the contrary, in a 
simultaneous model, all the subjects would decide on the N possible 
positions simultaneously and the amount of information available to each 
subject would be identical between them
8.  
The aim of this work is to experimentally test Schelling’s model making the 
subjects to play both in a sequential and in a simultaneous way. This is the 

8 In a simultaneous game, in which all individuals chose at the same time, no one knows 
a priori the choices made by the rest of the agents.  
first work in which a laboratory experiment of Schelling’s model, with 
individuals choosing simultaneously, takes place
9.  
In order to carry out the experiments, Schelling’s model is first designed in 
its original setting (where subjects take decisions sequentially) and later a 
modification is proposed, which will consist of the simultaneous decision of 
all subjects. The results of Schelling’s model experiment when subjects 
decide sequentially coincide with the theoretical prediction of Schelling’s 
model: in a single round subjects end up in equilibrium with total 
segregation. Surprisingly, in Schelling’s model experiment when 
individuals decide simultaneously we obtain the total segregation 
outcome, as well. In this second case, subjects’ heterogeneity generates a 
series of focal points in the first round, which are used by the subjects in 
order to locate themselves and, as a result, total segregation emerges 
again
10.  
The rest of the work is structured as follows: the second section shows 
Schelling’s standard model and its equilibrium prediction. In the third 
section we introduce a variation of Schelling’s model, in which subjects 
take the decisions simultaneously. The fourth section describes the design 
of the experiments carried out and their execution. The fifth section 
analyzes the results obtained, in order to conclude in the sixth section. 
 

9 Benito et al. (2009) presents a sequential Schelling’s experiment two different settings, 
with and without moving costs. 
10 A round is defined in this work as the moment in which all the participants have made 
their choice. In the simultaneous model it occurs when everyone has decided, the first 
round would be their first choice, while in the sequential model it occurs when all have 
chosen, that is, when the last agent who is supposed to choose has made his decision.  
2. Schelling's spatial proximity model. 
2.1. Schelling’s sequential model. 
In order to represent Schelling’s sequential model we start from a circle in 
which we distribute N subjects of two clearly differentiated types (whites 
and blacks)
 11. Each subject has his neighborhood defined as well as his 
adjacent neighbors to the left and the right hand sides, that is to say, every 
individual has two neighbors, the first one to his left and the second one to 
his right. This way, the number of neighborhoods in the circle is equal to 
the number of individuals that compose it, N. The model is defined by the 
following properties: first, subjects are supposed to have a utility function 
according to which they reach happiness when they have at least a 
neighbor of their same type
; second, subjects move sequentially and 
without cost (the first one decides first, then the following one decides, and 
this way up to the N-th agent
13).  
Though costs of mobility do not exist, Schelling imposes that subjects 
move to the most nearby place that satisfies his neighbor demand, bearing 
in mind that moving to the most nearby place means to be located in the 
closest space. A space is the distance between two persons. With these 
minimal requirements the society will change from a complete social 

11 Even though it is not necessary, we assume by symmetry that the number of subjects 
N is even, and that there are N/2 subjects belonging to each type. 
12 This should be understood as a not very strict requirement of the model: individuals 
only need one neighbor equal to them in order to acquire their maximum utility or 
happiness. 
13 The decision about the selection of subject who starts moving is random. But starting 
from the first one all the rest move in a consecutive way, for example towards the right. 
Whether individuals move to the right or to the left hand side is not relevant, what matters 
is that there is an order of movement and that it has to be clear.  
integration situation (figure 1, circle a) to a situation of absolute 
segregation (figure 1, circle b). 
How is total segregation reached? Figure 2 illustrates the movements for a 
society of 8 individuals, (N=8).  
Figure 2: Movements in the sequential game 
 
In the initial situation (figure 1, circle a) subjects are completely unhappy 
given that they do not have any neighbor of their same type. Let's suppose 
that the white player on the top left side is the first one taking his decision 
(who will be called 1). Given that he is not happy he moves to the closest 
place where he is happy. As a consequence subject 2 is happy now (and 
also is subject 8) and therefore this player does not move. Subject 3 is 
also happy (since subject 1 has placed to his side). Nevertheless, subject 
4 continues being an unhappy person since he still does not have any 
neighbor of his type. Therefore subject 4 moves next to subject 6. This 
makes happy both subject 6 (who is of his same color) and subject 5 (who 
is located next to subject 3). Finally, subject 7 that is not happy moves 
next to 2 and with it complete segregation is reached (see figure 2, circle 
4).  
In short, given the minimal requirements regarding the preferences of the 
model and with only three movements, full segregation is achieved. This is 
the "magic" of Schelling’s model. Nevertheless, the sequential movement 
makes everything very simple: when the players take decisions they 
already know what has happened, specifically they know that the previous 
subjects cannot move anymore, for which risk does not exist. For example, 
when subject 4 moves he knows that neither subject 5 nor subject 6 are 
going to move, not before not later (that is, they will not harm him 
afterwards).  
2.2 Schelling’s simultaneous model. 
To describe Schelling’s simultaneous model, we are going to suppose, as 
in the previous case, that N subjects, who can be of two different types, 
distributed along a circle, compose the society. We define the 
neighborhood for each one of them in the same way we did in the previous 
model. In this case the model comes characterized by the following 
properties: first, we continue assuming that subjects have a utility function 
according to which they reach happiness when they have at least a 
neighbor of their same type; second, subjects move without costs, but in 
this case all subjects decide whether to move or not at the same time, that 
is to say, it is a simultaneous decision; finally, subjects can move to any 
place they wish along the circle since their movement is not restricted to 
the most nearby place.  
The theoretical model to approach this problem would be a game in 
strategic form with N players. Every player would have N-1 pure  
strategies, which correspond to moving to each of the spaces that the N 
players form along the circle (these are N-2 strategies) or remaining still. 
Therefore, in the case of 8 players we would have the strategy of jumping 
clockwise into the second space, the third space and so on, up to the sixth 
space. Notice that to move either to the first or seventh space is to remain 
still. This finite game has, at least, an equilibrium in mixed strategies but in 
addition, multiple equilibria in pure strategies. With these requirements, the 
simultaneous model should be completely different from the sequential 
model. Nevertheless, the equilibrium outcome is also complete segrega-
tion. 
To explain the equilibrium outcome lets suppose that we are in a situation 
like the one represented in of the second circle of figure 2, in which 
individual number 4 is unhappy, as well as 5, 6 and 7. We are going to 
focus only on the movement of players 4 and 6
14. In this simultaneous 
game, player 4, does not know a priori if player 6 will be waiting for him 
when he arrives, if he decides to go next to him
15, therefore, subject 4 will 
probably decide to move to the least uncertain place, i.e. he would go to 
the "group of 2-8". The reason is simple: the group 2-8 is more certain 
than subject 6. There are many reasons why going to the big group is 
better: first, both subject 2 and 8 are happy one next to the other and, 

14To simplify the explanation, we assume that subjects 5 and 7 do not move, even 
though, as we will see, in the case in which they also moved, none of them would choose 
to locate between subjects 2 and 8, because this position would not be a good strategy 
for them. 
15 It is important to remember that all subjects make the choice of moving (or not moving) 
simultaneously, therefore when subject 6 chooses to move, he does not know what 
subject 4 is going to do.  
therefore, they will not move; second, subject 4 could "anticipate" that 
subject 6 might be thinking in the same way he is, that is, subject 6 is 
thinking to move to the big group and will not be in his position if subject 4 
would choose to go to his side. Figure 3 represents the situation in which 
only subjects 4 and 6 move, and a situation of absolute segregation is 
reached (figure 3, circle 2). 
 
 
Figure 3: Movement of 4 and 6 in the simultaneous game 
 
In a game with these characteristics, subjects can often coordinate their 
intentions or expectations with others, as each one knows that the other is 
trying to do the same thing he is doing. Most of the situations provide 
some hints for coordination, some focal points (hints) for every agent of 
what others might expect from them.
16 It is evident that if there is no 
convergence, the process of prediction and interaction turns out to be 
unsuccessful. The key is that when taking their decisions individuals try to 
accomplish a common task, not an individual one
. Each one reduces his 

Quoting Coricelli and Nagel (2009, p. 9163): “Psychologists and philosophers define 
this as theory of mind or mentalizing, the ability to think about others’ thoughts and 
mental states to predict their intentions and actions”. 
17 Rizzolatti, Fogassi and Gallese (2006) suggest that in primates and humans there are 
specific neuronal circuits in order to interiorize the tasks or movements of other human  
space of search by means of the spontaneous use of hints that have the 
highest probability of making both of their expectations convergent, which 
Binmore and Samuelson (2006) call as the exploitation of framing 
information (use contextual information). 
To find the hint, or rather the search for this key, is to find some code that 
is mutually recognized by all subjects as the key. This search may depend 
on precedents, accidental agreements, symmetry, geometric configuration, 
etc. And it is in this way that these keys turn out to be focal points of the 
game, Schelling (1960). In summary, it seems that only focal points are 
needed for the subjects of the simultaneous game, in order to generate 
the full segregation obtained in the sequential model. 

3. Design and implementation of the experiment. 
The experiment was carried out using an instructions book (set) where it 
was explained the proceedings of the game and how subjects could obtain 
the maximum happiness (see a copy of the instructions in the annex). In 
order to achieve that each of the individual participants in the experiments 
had a preference on the composition of his neighborhood, from which they 
could obtain happiness, each of them there was paid with two Euros if at 
least one of his adjacent neighbors (one to his left and another to his right 
hand side) was of his same type by the end of the experiment. If none of 
the adjacent neighbors was of his same type, the payment received was 

beings or members of the same specie or of other species. See as well Fogassi et al. 
(2005) and Gallese, Keysers and Rizzolatti (2004).  
zero (the individual was unhappy). In all the games, both in the sequential 
and in the simultaneous ones, the initial configuration was that of 
maximum unhappiness for all the subjects that compose the society (figure 
1a), and therefore they were not obtaining any payment. Only the 
movement allowed subjects to reach the maximum happiness and to 
receive the stipulated payment. For simplicity, an equal size of 8 subjects 
was used in all the cases. 
The 8 subjects were placed in two rows (4 subjects in each) and received 
a white or black scarf to be identified as a white typed or a black typed 
subject. Subjects were explained to make a circle between both rows and 
they were asked to identify the color of the scarves of their adjacent 
neighbors. Thus, from the initial position, each subject could verify that his 
neighbors were different from him, and therefore all the subjects were 
unhappy.  
In the execution of the game, subjects who played the sequential game 
had to wait for their turn to decide if they were moving or not (observing 
what had happened). However, in the simultaneous game all the subjects 
were taking their decisions simultaneously (without knowing those made 
by the others). A control sheet served to inform either in one case or 
another (see the sample in figure 9 of the annex). The experiment played 
just once (one shot game). 
The experiments were carried out in the Universidad Pública de Navarra 
(in Pamplona) and in the Universitat de València, following the subsequent 
distribution:  
•  Pamplona: 56 subjects distributed in sequential models (2 groups of 
8 subjects) and in simultaneous models (5 groups of 8 subjects); 
and, 
•  Valencia: 40 subjects distributed in sequential models (2 groups of 
8 subjects) and in simultaneous models (3 groups of 8 subjects).  
In both universities, the experiments took place after finishing a regular 
class with students who willingly chose to remain. There was no 
recruitment of students or subjects who specifically came for the 
experiment. The task did not last more than 10 minutes and all the 
subjects earned 2 Euros (on average and in mode since all they won, see 
Tables 1 and 2). There was no show-up fee.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Results of the sequential games 
Three out of four of the sequential games worked exactly as theory 
predicts (see table 1 below). That is to say, subject 1 (who was not happy) 
moved next to subject 3, making subjects 2, 3 and 8 happy, then subject 4 
(who was not happy either) moved next to subject 6, making subjects 5 
and 6 happy. Finally subject 7 (who was not happy yet) had no other 
choice but moving next to subject 1 (see figure 2).  
Complete segregation was generated as a consequence of the 
movements of subjects 1, 4 and 7. 
 
  
Group  City  Round  Movers 
Non 
movers  Happies 
Non-
happies 
0    0  8 
A1 Pamplona  1 1,4,7  2,3,5,6,8 8  0 
0    0  8 
A2 Pamplona  1 2,5,8  1,3,4,6  8 0 
0    0  8 
A3 Valencia  1 1,4,7  2,3,5,6,8 8  0 
0    0  8 
A4 Valencia  1 1,4,7  2,3,5,6,8 8  0 
 
Table 1: Results of the sequential games. 
 
Nevertheless, for one of the groups (group A2 of Pamplona, see figure 4) 
an interesting variation was produced. In this group, subject 1, in spite of 
being in a situation in which he was not happy, realized (technically “he 
anticipated") that he could stay still and allow the others to solve the 
situation later. In other words, subject 1 realized that the other players 
would have no other choice but moving to be happy and that he would end 
up being happy without needing to move. Subject 2, who was not happy 
given that subject 1 had not moved, fulfilled subject one’s expectation and 
moved next to subject 4. Thus, he made subjects 1, 3 and 4 happy. As in 
the previous case, at the end three players moved (subjects 2, 5 and 8, 
see figure 4), ending up in a situation of complete segregation of the 
society where all subjects are happy. 
Result 1: The players of Schelling’s sequential model reach the 
equilibrium of complete segregation with the three movements foreseen in 
the theory.  
 
Figure 4: Sequential game in which p. 1 being unhappy does not move 
 
4.2 Results of the simultaneous games 
A priori, and as we anticipated previously, we should expect different 
results for the simultaneous game with regard to the sequential game, 
mainly for two reasons:  
1. First, in the simultaneous game, all the subjects possess, at all 
times, the same information. In the sequential games we find that 
after each decision the past information is bigger (since the subjects 
already know the movements that have happened) and the future 
information is minor (fewer movements are left to be solved). 
Nevertheless, in the simultaneous game all the subjects decide at 
the same time for each round without knowing the decisions of any 
of the other subjects, since there is not any order for decision-
making. 
2. Second, in the simultaneous game the results are only probable 
(not assured), this is, a subject can decide to go into a position in 
which, when he arrives there, the subjects he expected to find are  
not there anymore, because the subjects have decided to move as 
well. 
Therefore, how should subjects play in this game? The optimal way of 
playing in the simultaneous game is the following:  
-  first, every subject generates for himself a distribution of 
types of players, in which he will consider those individuals 
who are going to move and those who will remain still;  
-  second, given this expectation the subject will decide which 
is his best response, i.e., he will move to the most 
convenient place for him given what he anticipates that the 
other subjects will do. 
As suggested by the literature of "levels of reasoning" (Nagel 1995, Bosch 
et al. 2002) one can expect to find variety in the best responses, this is, we 
can find subjects that (optimally) do not move, move a little or a lot. And 
therefore, given the initial situation of white-black-white-black-white-black-
white-black and the heterogeneity of types
, it is very probable that at 
least two focal points of size 2 would appear: white-white or black-black. 
Table 2 presents the number of subjects that moved in every round and 
the number of happy subjects when each of the rounds finished. Figures 
5, 6, 7 and 8 show the result for the 8 simultaneous games. Figure 5 
illustrates the case of two of them (S1 and S3), Figure 6 shows how other 
two games were played (S2 and S7), Figure 7 represents how the game 

18 If all subjects were identical, any movement will generate the initial situation given that 
all subjects would carry out the same movement and the only result would be a spin with 
identical distribution.  
S6 was played, and Figure 8 presents game S5. Notice that two of the 8 
games are missing.  
 
Group  City  Round  Movers 
Non-
movers  Happies 
Non-
happies 
0     0 8 
1 7 1 4 4 
S1 Pamplona  2 4 4 8 0 
0     0 8 
1 5 3 4 4 
S2 Pamplona  2 4 4 8 0 
0     0 8 
1 4 4 4 4 
S3 Pamplona  2 3 5 8 0 
0     0 8 
S4 Pamplona  1 6 2 8 0 
0     0 8 
1 4 4 7 1 
S5 Pamplona  2 1 7 8 0 
0     0 8 
1 6 2 7 1 
S6 Valencia  2 1 7 8 0 
0     0 8 
1 7 1 4 4 
S7 Valencia  2 4 4 8 0 
0     0 8 
S8 Valencia  1 5 3 8 0 
 
Table 2: Results of the simultaneous games 
 
Both in Pamplona (group S4) and in Valencia (group S8) we found that the 
Schelling’s simultaneous game was played in such way that it came to a 
distribution of maximum segregation in just one round. It went from Figure 
1a to 1b without intermediate steps. In these two cases, an explanation to 
the result is that all subjects made an accurate prediction and reached 
equilibrium in one movement. The alternative explanation is that it  
occurred accidentally, which is not surprising since this result is, according 
to theory, relatively probable (20 %). 
The rest of Schelling’s simultaneous games have been represented in the 
4 figures already mentioned. In four of them, the two most a priori 
expected focal points were created (white-white and black-black): in two of 
them the focal points turned out to be placed one next to the other (Figure 
5); and, in the other two, the focal points are placed distant from each 
other (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 5: Neighbor Focal Points 
 
 
Figure 6: Distant Focal Points 
 
Regarding the generation of the focal points, there are 4 games (S1, S3, 
S2 and S7, Figure 5 and 6) in which, 2 focal points appear during the first 
round (close or distant). In one of the games (S6, Figure 7) during the first 
round, a distribution with two focal points composed by three subjects of  
every type (white-white-white and black-black-black) was reached, and 
only two individuals, one of each type, were unhappy after making their 
decision.  
Finally, in a game (S7, Figure 8) the almost perfect segregation was 




Figure 7: Two big focal points 
 
 
Figure 8: A big focal point and a small focal point 
 
It is interesting to highlight that in all the cases the maximum segregation 
distribution was reached, in two cases after only one round and in six 
cases after the second round. The simplest explanation for this surprising 
result (total segregation in the simultaneous games) can be found in the 
theory (see for example, Reny, 1988, 1993 and Samuelson, 1992 among  
others) and it is sustained upon two principles: rationality and common 
knowledge. 
•  From the rationality point of view, all the subjects that were not 
happy moved to the right place for them to reach happiness. 
•  From the common knowledge of rationality point of view: subjects 
who were happy "knew" that those neighbors who were composing 
the focal point together with them, would not move because they 
are already happy and therefore, they are not moving either
19. In 
addition, those who were moving knew they will go to spaces from 
where, assuming rationality, nobody would move. 
Therefore, a requirement as basic as rationality (with common knowledge) 
is sufficient to make the requirement of sequential movement not so 
important. In other words, rationality with common knowledge generates 
the same result that the one obtained from a sequential model.  
Result 2: As a consequence of rationality (together with common 
knowledge), subjects of Schelling’s simultaneous game reached, in a 
maximum of two rounds, the completely segregated equilibrium. 
Result 3: The completely segregated equilibrium appears in an almost 




19 If two people have the same a prioris, and their posterioris for a given event are 
common knowledge, then these posterioris should also be the same. For a broader 
discussion about the concept of common knowledge in decision-making in games see 
Aumann (1976).  
5. Conclusions 
Schelling's spatial proximity model (1969, 1971a) is established with a 
series of minimal requirements with regard to the subjects that form 
society: subjects look for their best interest with some slightly inflexible 
preferences (a neighbor of his same color). Nevertheless the equilibrium 
outcome of this model is very powerful: complete segregation of society.  
The aim of this work was to verify, through the experimental analysis, first 
of all, if complete segregation takes place. The second aim of this study 
was to verify if Schelling’s model would give the same result of absolute 
segregation after modifying one of its most important properties: 
sequential movement for subjects, in contrast to playing simultaneously. 
The results obtained are forceful. 
1. First, we obtain that when subjects play Schelling’s sequential 
model, the result is a society that ends up completely segregated.  
2. Secondly, when subjects play Schelling’s simultaneous model 
nothing changes and complete segregation emerges without 
difficulty.  
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the set of information that players handle 
between one environment and the other is radically different - and in 
addition uncertainty after the movements appears - the result turns out to 
be the same: complete segregation of the society. 
In Schelling’s model, the movements of the individuals are ruled to satisfy 
their preferences. The individuals look for their happiness and whatever 
others have done or are going to do, does not intervene in their decision.  
This is so because of the assumption of the sequential movement, which 
makes them consider their decision as a problem of individual 
optimization: they do not need to learn anything and neither they have to 
signal anything for the future. 
In the simultaneous environment, the existence of multiple equilibria 
makes them look for a coordination system. Therefore, in the first round a 
code is established and it turns into public knowledge for all the 
individuals. The first round serves to identify the types of players; it is then 
a phase of learning. The second round is a new refinement of equilibria 
where the selection criterion comes given by a follow-up to the focal points 
that have been created in the previous stage. Once more, it is crucial that 
individuals behave rationally (a player moves if he is not happy) and 
rationality is common knowledge (all the players know that happy players 
will remain still). As a consequence, subjects reach in a simple manner the 
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The instructions for the subjects who took part in the experiments are 
detailed below. Subjects were distributed in groups of eight for both of the 
treatments carried out: a treatment in which they were playing Schelling’s 
sequential model (Case A) and another treatment in which they were 
playing Schelling’s simultaneous model (Case S). The instructions that we 
introduce as follows are for the subjects with Black scarf in both 
treatments. For the subjects with White scarf the instructions are the 
same, just changing the color by which the subject is identified and the 
color of the neighbors who make him happy. 
 
Instructions Case A: 
 
1.  Please, tie the scarf around your neck. 
2.   For the accomplishment of the task you are 8 subjects: 4 in a row of 
desks and other 4 in the desks behind. Turn around to see all your 
partners. 
3.   There are two types of subjects: those with a white scarf and those 
with a black one. As you already know, you are Black. 
 
How do I earn money? 
 
4.  If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color, you earn 2 Euros. This is: 
•  If both your neighbor to your right and to your left hand side are 
white, then you will NOT earn anything.
•  If your neighbor to your right or to your left hand side (or both of 
them) is black, you will earn 2 Euros.
 
5. We allow you to move (if you want to!). You can locate yourself in the 
most nearby space that you wish. A space is the distance that exists 
between two persons. You can jump as much as you wish (a place, two 
places, etc). You can only move to your right, this is counter clockwise. 
 
6. How can I move? You have to write in your sheet the place to which you 
want to move. Write on your sheet your current position in blue and the 
position where you wish to move in black, if you do not move write in black 
your current position. Your sheet will be picked up and then you will be 
told the new set up.  
Well, we are going to play 
 
7. Now we will throw a dice. With this dice, the first person to move will be 
chosen. In consecutive order (towards the right) the rest will move. The 
beginner will make his choice (not moving, moving, jumping one place, 
moving by jumping two places, …, moving by jumping 6 places). When 
you are told, you will have to make your choice. Write on your sheet your 
current location in blue and the position where you are moving in black, if 
you are not moving write in black your current location. 
 
8. Your sheet will be gathered, and your set up will be communicated to 
you. 
 
9. If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color then you will earn 2 Euros. 
 
 
Instructions Case S: 
 
 
1.  Please, tie the scarf around your neck. 
2.   For the accomplishment of the task you are 8 subjects: 4 in a row of 
desks and other 4 in the desks behind. Turn around to see all your 
partners. 
3.   There are two types of subjects: those with a white scarf and those 
with a black one. As you already know, you are Black. 
 
How do I earn money? 
 
4.  If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color, you earn 2 Euros. This is: 
 
•  If both your neighbor to your right and to your left hand side are 
white, then you will NOT earn anything.
•  If your neighbor to your right or to your left hand side (or both of 
them) is black, you will earn 2 Euros.
 
5. We allow you to move (if you want to!). You can locate yourself in the 
most nearby space that you wish. A space is the distance that exists 
between two persons. You can jump as much as you wish (a place, two 
places, etc). You can only move to your right, that is, counter clockwise. 
 
6. How can I move? You have to write in your sheet the place to which you 
want to move. Write on your sheet your current position in blue and the 
position where you wish to move in black, if you do not move write in black  
your current position. Your sheet will be picked up and then you will be 
told the new set up. 
  
Well, we are going to play   
 
7. You will make your choice (not moving, moving, jumping one place, 
moving by jumping two places, …, moving by jumping 6 places). When 
you are told you will have to make your choice. Write on your sheet your 
current location in blue and the position where you are moving in black, if 
you are not moving write in black your current location. 
 
8. Your sheet will be gathered, and your set up will be communicated to 
you. 
 
9. If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color then you will earn 2 Euros. 
 
Figure 9 shows the graph given to the subjects where they could clearly 
identify both their position and that of the rest of individuals in their group. 
In the case of the simultaneous game, every individual had one like this, 
which was gathered in order to determine the decision made by each 
subject, whereas in the sequential case the same graph went from one 
subject to another, considering the order of movement, and therefore the 
graph was automatically updated with each subjects annotations.  
 
 
Figure A: Control Graph for each group 